Indigenous Credit Associations in Botswana: An Application of Elinor Ostrom\u27s Common-Pool Resource Analysis by Yates, Christopher A.
Western Kentucky University
TopSCHOLAR®
Honors College Capstone Experience/Thesis
Projects Honors College at WKU
Spring 5-10-2013
Indigenous Credit Associations in Botswana: An
Application of Elinor Ostrom's Common-Pool
Resource Analysis
Christopher A. Yates
Western Kentucky University, Christopher.Yates952@topper.wku.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/stu_hon_theses
Part of the International Business Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors College Capstone Experience/
Thesis Projects by an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact connie.foster@wku.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yates, Christopher A., "Indigenous Credit Associations in Botswana: An Application of Elinor Ostrom's Common-Pool Resource
Analysis" (2013). Honors College Capstone Experience/Thesis Projects. Paper 403.
http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/stu_hon_theses/403
 INDIGENOUS CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN BOTSWANA: AN APPLICATION OF 
ELINOR OSTROM’S COMMON-POOL RESOURCE ANALYSIS 
 
A Capstone Experience/Thesis Project 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree Bachelor of Arts with 
Honors College Graduate Distinction at Western Kentucky University 
 
By 
Christopher A. Yates 
***** 
 
Western Kentucky University 
2013 
 
 
CE/T Committee  
         Approved by    
Dr. Brian Strow, Advisor 
 
Dr. Cathy Carey     _______________________ 
            Advisor 
Dr. Melinda Grimsley-Smith      Department of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
Christopher A. Yates 
2013 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
In this paper I attempt to analyze and explain the important of certain indigenous 
credit agreements in Botswana. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations are agreements 
made by a group of people who create a communal fund which rotates around the group 
until each member had had access to the pooled resource. These agreements are informal 
and most commonly found in the poorer traditional sectors of Botswana’s economy. 
Furthermore, I attempt to explain why these agreements can be best understood 
using Elinor Ostrom’s common-pool resource analysis. This framework explains why 
these agreements are so successful in creating a source of capital, which is sustainable 
and long-enduring, for many entrepreneurs who belong to the poor sectors of the 
economy. Also, using this analysis, certain policy decisions can be critiqued as to how 
best to categorize and foster these indigenous institutions so that more people can have 
access to informal credit. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Africa’s paradox is that it is flooded with immense natural, agricultural, and 
human resources, yet many of its countries are characterized by poverty, short life 
expectancies, political instability, disease, and chaos. Although some countries have seen 
success in spite of these hostile environments, Africa as a whole has not been able to 
meet her full potential. Semi-successful countries, like Botswana, are characterized, in 
many cases, by their tendency and willingness to adopt and allow for indigenous African 
institutions to solve many of the local and communal economic problems. My research 
explores informal credit, capital, and finance markets in order to determine how their 
roles as indigenous institutions have provided much needed capital and funding for 
developing countries. 
Specifically, I have attempted to analyze informal credit associations and lending 
institutions that occur in many areas where formal banking and lending institutions are 
not present or do not sufficiently meet the needs of many of the citizens: Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). Though ROSCAs have many names and 
cultural foundations which vary depending on the geographical location and 
demographical makeup, they have proven to be effective at increasing the amount of 
capital that is available to entrepreneurs in the developing world. To understand why 
these have been particularly effective in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special emphasis on 
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the urban and rural areas of Botswana, I apply Elinor Ostrom’s analysis on Common Pool 
Resources (CPR).She discusses how resources can be efficiently distributed within 
certain institutional frameworks and how joint-venture, collective choice agreements can 
be more beneficial (both culturally and economically) than traditional, formal credit 
institutions for everyone. Loanable funds, within the construct of ROSCAs, can be 
viewed as CPRs which are renewed and distributed according to the governance and 
organization provided by the appropriators and contributors of the funds. In this context, 
ROSCAs meet the seven primary design principles for long-enduring CPR institutions 
which Ostrom outlined in her extensive work on the topic of Common-Pool Resources. 
By explaining ROSCAs with Ostrom’s CPR institutional analysis, I explain how such 
agreements are formed by analyzing certain case studies from Gaborone and other areas 
in Botswana while explaining the rules of institutional development inherit in these 
agreements. Using a historical understanding and current data, policy decisions were 
concluded as to what role policy and centralized government can play in developing and 
making these credit associations and capital more available to urban and agricultural 
entrepreneurs. 
Though this study is specific to Africa, with Botswana acting as a model, the 
framework applied can be extended to other economically developing areas that are in 
need of entrepreneurial development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Because of Africa’s immense natural wealth and potential for growth, there has 
been a variety of articles published by author’s giving their solutions to “fix” Africa. 
However, it is quite often the case that these solutions involve African countries adopting 
and creating westernized institutions to fit the need of African countries. Historically, 
Botswana has had leadership which actively avoids this trend. But for many other 
countries in Africa, leaders have chosen to try and supplant new institutions that do not fit 
in an African context (Ayittey 1998). New institutions that were adopted inhibited growth 
that had been created by the traditional, indigenous institutions that existed prior to the 
colonial era. To break the “vicious cycle of poverty” that Africa was experiencing, many 
development experts concluded that the solution was capital formation and accumulation. 
Furthermore, because most of Africa was poor and lacked savings, its capital markets 
either did not exist or were greatly underdeveloped (Ibid.). The only way to get out of this 
trap was with infusions of capital from abroad and the adoption of those institutions that 
had fostered capital growth in the west. This came in the form of foreign aid and the 
World Bank supporting national, and central banking authorities which rallied to help 
establish banking institutions to provide vehicles for savings (Ibid.) These unsuccessful 
measures fueled some of the instability because many leaders, going back to the colonial 
period, did not take into account the effect that such measures would have on the 
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indigenous African institutions. The informal sectors of the African economy actually 
had vehicles for savings and means for capital accumulation, but it was the suppression 
of national governments and poor leadership that fueled the cycle of poverty. 
Botswana had a different history than most of Africa. In its post-colonial period – 
1966 through the mid-1980s – and with the election of Seretse Khama, the government 
followed a fairly liberal tradition of free markets. The indigenous sectors of Botswana 
were left to thrive and over time there was capital flight into Botswana, saving increased, 
and so did collective action agreements such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(Ibid.) However, as pointed out by many economists, it is believed that informal credit 
institutions that occur outside of the context of formalized institutions are not competitive 
and that they will become less and less important in the accumulation of capital. This has 
not proven to be the case and these informal agreements which have their roots in long-
standing African traditions actually have an advantage over the formalized systems which 
suffer from serious informational problems and asymmetries (van der Brink and Chavas 
1997). 
Putting ROSCA development and operations within the context of common-pool 
resource helps explain how they are better able to satisfy demand for credit and spur 
entrepreneurial growth for many sectors of the economy. Because ROSCAs, as credit 
institutions, meet a variety of design principles that are characterized by long-enduring 
common-pool resource agreements, they can provide those individuals who are 
appropriators of the funds within the ROSCA with sufficient capital for a variety of 
entrepreneurial activities (Ostrom 1990). Furthermore, due to the unique nature of each 
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individual ROSCA, they are able to be tailored to the needs and individual circumstances 
of those who are seeking access to credit. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING ELINOR OSTROM’S CPR ANALYSIS 
 
 
Elinor Ostrom began her work on common-pool resources in an attempt to offer a 
different solution to the tragedy of the commons. Traditional thought dictates that there 
are two primary methods for dealing with the tragedy of the commons problem: by the 
way of the state/state intervention and by way of privatization and property rights. The 
first presumption leads us to think that to avoid the overuse and overconsumption of 
natural resources where there is no clear owner of that property, an external agent – most 
commonly thought to be a central government authority or agency – is necessary. This 
external agent will then decide who can use the resource, to what extent they can use it, 
when they can use it, and how many others may use it. Of course this management does 
not have to take form of directives and mandates, but it can the form of taxes on 
resources use and the issuance of other fees and penalties for using the resource (Pigou 
1920). This line of thought, where a central authority has to monitor and protect a 
resource from overconsumption, assumes that the central authority has the proper 
knowledge, access to reliable information, ability to readily monitor the resource, and can 
operate with near-zero costs. Under these conditions, the central agent could determine 
what the optimally efficient level of consumption and use of that resource is. However, 
this is hardly ever the case when it comes to governmental management of resources. 
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Constant monitoring, determining optimal output, and imposing sanctions requires 
information that is nearly impossible for any one authority to be able to obtain. 
The second method for dealing with the tragedy of the commons was most 
famously described by Ronald Coase. He proposed that assigning property rights to the 
resource will ensure that the most efficient level of resource extraction will occur as long 
as there are zero or near zero transactions costs (Coase 1937). Furthermore, it does not 
matter who the property rights are assigned to as long as they are assigned and there are 
no barriers to transacting between those who wish to use the resource. However, even 
though property rights to certain resources can be assigned and divided among 
appropriators of the resource, the resource system can still be owned in common when 
the resource is non-stationary (a common example of a non-stationary resource is a 
fishery). As Colin Clark states (1992, 117), “common ownership is the fundamental fact 
affecting most ever regime of fishery management.” Though there are significant benefits 
to assigning property rights over resource management via central direction, assuming 
that it is the only way to efficiently manage resources is not necessarily true. 
These two recommendations are often posed as diametrically opposed positions 
and it is posited that if one recommendation is correct, the other must be incorrect. 
However, both the central direction and privatization advocates agree that institutional 
change that affects the management of these resources must be the result of some 
autonomous change from the outside. They both agree that some outside authority, which 
has no direct relation to the resource, is necessary in order to modify the institutional 
framework and impose it on the appropriators to achieve an efficient outcome. Elinor 
Ostrom’s solution ventures far from these two well-known positions and instead presents 
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the argument that establishing sound institutions is incredibly difficult, time-consuming, 
and can very well lead to internal conflicts. It is a process that requires very unique 
knowledge about time and place and deep knowledge of culture and the rules of that 
culture (Ostrom 1990). As such, in a field setting, public and private institutions are 
hardly ever separate; they depend on one another. 
Ostrom’s solution to the commons dilemma is one that combines these two 
theories into an institution of self-government by appropriators. Ostrom recognizes the 
presentation of the commons problem is an illustration of a typical prisoner’s dilemma 
where the dominant strategy among the appropriators of a resource is to act in non-
cooperative ways to ensure maximization of their own utility (Ibid.). However, if the 
appropriators are able to communicate freely and can determine that that the worst 
outcome for all parties is if all parties defect from a cooperative strategy, the 
appropriators involved can agree to a contract and ask a third party enforcer – a private 
arbitrator who is bound by the terms of a contract and not some outside the legal 
framework – to ensure that the other parties do not defect from the agreement. As soon as 
it is accepted that a private party may take on the role of an external enforcer, a wide 
variety of implications can be derived.  
A personally financed contract-enforcement situation allows for greater 
cooperation between parties that were originally non-cooperative. The appropriators of 
the resource can now set “the rules of the game” as they see fit to ensure efficiency. 
Furthermore, the agreement is made by the appropriators and is not coercively forced 
upon them by some autonomous, external authority; this solution allows for institutional 
flexibility. Also, it encourages for individuals to make long-term arrangements about the 
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management of resources that they were previously unable to make (Ibid.). This type of 
agreement is vastly different from external agents imposing rules on resource 
management. The new institutional arrangements allows for the appropriators to 
internalize the costs of management, enforcement, monitoring, and the costs of gathering 
specific knowledge of time and place that were previously imposed on the external agents 
– the government. Self-interest of the appropriators dictate that they would monitor the 
resource and the other appropriators for infractions of the contract and report them to the 
privately hired, third-party arbitrator who would then inquire about the infraction and 
settle and disputes among appropriators.     
These institutional alternatives to state management and property right 
assignments are not just mere theoretical constructs; there are actual, empirical examples 
where these institutions exist and have existed for prolonged periods of time. Ostrom and 
other authors have provided many examples that range from fisheries in Turkey and 
communal meadows and graze lands in Switzerland to irrigation management systems in 
Spain and the Philippines. Despite the significant differences among how the institution 
operates given local circumstances, customs, and norms, all share the same fundamental 
framework under which they operate. Among these similarities though, the fact that they 
have persevered despite communal ownership and management is the most interesting 
(Ostrom 2005). The key to understanding why these resources, which by traditional 
economic thinking should have faced a tragedy of the commons dilemma, have been 
sustainable and long-enduring, is to explain how and why individuals have been able to 
act collectively despite complex, uncertain, and interdependent environments in which 
individuals have such strong incentives to deviate from the cooperative strategy.  
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Though each CPR system differs in its particular structure, it is because of these 
particular differences they are able to survive. Without these differences that arise from 
factors such as differences in physical settings of the resource system, cultural norms and 
mores, and economic and political relationships, the appropriators of the resource would 
not be able to take advantage of the flexibility that local CPR agreements provide. 
However, despite the vast differences in particulars, Ostrom was able to identify a list of 
seven design principles that all common-pool resource agreements have in common 
which have made them long-enduring and successful in maintaining sustainability. These 
design principles include: 1) clearly defined boundaries; 2) congruence between rules and 
local conditions; 3) collective-choice arrangements; 4) monitoring systems; 5) graduated 
sanctions for violators; 6) conflict-resolution mechanisms; 7) recognition of rights to 
organize. Before moving on and explaining how rotating savings and credit associations 
in Botswana can be understood within Ostrom’s framework and analysis, it is necessary 
first to explain each of the seven design principles in greater detail. 
Clearly defined boundaries 
In context of the Coase Theorem, clearly defining who can and who cannot 
withdraw resources from a well-defined resource system is the closest similarity to 
assigning property rights to the resource. However, despite the fact that the resource and 
the appropriators of the resource are clearly defined, as are the rules of entry for new 
appropriators, it does not change that the resource is still commonly owned by multiple 
parties – the number of which changes with the nature of the resource and the agreement 
(Ostrom 1990). But without this step of clearly defining the resource and those who can 
expropriate resources from it, those appropriators that are in agreement leave the resource 
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open to those outsiders who could benefit from the resource without contributing 
anything to the CPR agreement. For the CPR agreement to be successful and sustainable, 
there has to be some degree of excludability from the resource. Furthermore, by closing 
the boundaries and establishing who may and may not use the resource system, the 
appropriators must set rules that limit the appropriation of resources and mandate certain 
behaviors of provision of the appropriators. 
Congruence between rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules that restrict time, place, technology, and the quantity of 
resource units that can be withdrawn must take local conditions, the conditions of the 
resource system, and the rules of provision (rules set up by the appropriators that 
designate what resources – labor, funding, materials, etc. – all other appropriators must 
provide for the resource system) into consideration (Ibid.). Rules for resource 
appropriation are very unique to the given circumstance of the CPR and any single set of 
rules could not possibly deal with the unique issues that may arise in all resource systems. 
The understood rules of a CPR must be created, and allowed to be modified, by those 
individuals that use the resource system 
Institutions that allow for the creation and modification of rules by those 
individuals that are most affected by them are ones that are best able to fit the institution 
to the specific characteristics of the physical and social environment of the resource 
system. Ostrom theorizes that maintaining low costs in regards to changing the rules is 
one of the primary reasons that there are such high compliance rates with the original 
contract in long-enduring CPR institutions (Ibid.).External enforcement of rules can only 
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partly explain the high compliance rates; internal rule creation helps explain some of the 
remaining portion. 
Monitoring 
Monitors and third-party enforcers who enforce the rules of the mutually agreed 
upon contract at the creation of the CPR agreement are accountable to appropriators of 
the resource. Successful monitoring of the resource system is one of the most difficult 
aspects of CPR agreements to maintain successfully over the long-term because there are 
strong incentives for both appropriators and monitors to deviate from a cooperative 
strategy. However, many CPR agreements have been able to overcome this problem 
through a mutual-monitoring framework where appropriators are the monitors and they 
report deviant behaviors to the other appropriators Ibid.). The robust systems of 
monitoring have been major contributors to CPR agreement commitment. Mutual-
monitoring systems produce private benefits for those who monitor as well as disperse 
benefits that come from the success of the rules. 
Graduated Sanctions 
A system of graduated sanctions that range from minor fines and fees to 
banishment from the resource system may be more efficient in producing and 
maintaining cooperative strategies between the appropriators than a system of significant 
and inflexible sanctions. Furthermore, a mutual-monitoring system where the 
appropriators act as the monitors and enforcers of the CPR agreement can generate a 
system where the particular circumstances surrounding a rule infraction are more well-
known and the violator of the rule can be punished appropriately given the individual 
circumstances (Ibid.). If the violator normally follows the rules of the agreement but, due 
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to some extenuating personal circumstances, found the benefits of acting in a non-
cooperative way to exceed the costs, the other appropriators may find that a small and 
insignificant punishment may be more suitable to maintaining the overall agreement than 
a significant penalty that seriously punishes the rule breaker. A system of graduated 
sanctions is an attempt by appropriators to maintain CPR membership and sustainability 
of the resource system. 
Conflict-Resolution mechanisms 
For individuals to understand and follow a given set of rules over a long period of 
time, there must be some kind of institutional mechanism for the appropriators of a 
resource to resolve, question, and address what constitutes a rule infraction. If individuals 
within a CPR agreement make simple mistakes or face extreme personal hardships that 
make deviant behavior beneficial and they do not have easy and low-costs access to local 
arenas of conflict resolution, rules may eventually come to be seen as unjust or unfair 
which could contribute to a significant decrease in compliance rates and a dissipation of 
the CPR agreement altogether (Ibid.).  
Recognition of rights to organize 
By recognition of rights of organize, Ostrom means that the “rights of 
appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external government 
authorities.” Because the self-governing CPR agreements are not created with the 
permission of any centralized government and are instead the outgrowths of local, 
indigenous institutions, they are not formalized under the jurisdiction of state or federal 
governments. If the governmental authorities see it as their sole right to be able to grant 
such permission and create institutions within a geographical boundary, it will be very 
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difficult for local appropriators to maintain a CPR agreement over the long-term (Ibid.). 
Given that external authorities recognize the legitimacy of these rules set up by the CPR 
agreement and its appropriators, the appropriators, monitors, and third-party enforcers of 
the agreement may be able create long-lasting institutions that are more efficient and 
desirable than any institution that is imposed upon them. 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Botswana 
Understanding Elinor Ostrom’s thesis on local institutional development of 
common-pooled resources is key to understanding how and why informal credit markets, 
where capital resources are pooled by a number of individuals within a local setting, 
come into existence and why they have been so successful in providing certain sectors of 
the population of Botswana with capital. Broadly defined, a rotating savings and credit 
association (ROSCA) – which goes by a variety of names within Africa, but most 
commonly referred to as a njangeh in the traditional and rural sectors of Botswana – is a 
voluntary association of men and women who meet at predetermined intervals and 
distribute some pooled source of capital funding to one of its members. The cycle 
continues until each of the members of the ROSCA have received their distribution of the 
communal funds. The funds or capital resource are renewed at each meeting and are 
made up of fixed or variable contributions from each member in the pool (Henever 
2006). Though ROSCAs take many forms and can have complex and unique rules 
determined by the local customs, needs, and circumstances of the members of the fund, 
the general structure of a rotating fund which gets distributed among the members is 
common to all agreements.  
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Maintaining the characteristics of a CPR agreement, ROSCA have a general 
framework similar to that described by Ostrom. The originator and leader of the 
association – the one who regularly hosts the predetermined meetings – and several other 
managers chosen by the members of the association are charged with monitoring the 
various transactions made by the other members of and safekeeping the communal fund. 
The leader of the agreement, along with the other members, is also responsible for 
imposing fines and sanctions to enforce the agreed upon rules of the ROSCA. The 
general structure and division of responsibilities inherent in these agreements are very 
similar, if not identical, to the seven design principles pointed out and elaborated upon by 
Ostrom. However, there is a key difference between what Ostrom described in her CPR 
analysis and ROSCA formation. It does not necessarily alter or invalidate any of the 
claims that Ostrom presents, but it does extend her analysis beyond what she intended. 
Unlike natural resources (such as fisheries, irrigation/water systems, and graze lands) 
which she thoroughly covers in her thesis, ROSCAs consist of man-made, synthetic 
materials such as durable goods of funds for capital accumulation. Though the two are 
vastly different, the same implications can be applied to this non-natural, renewable 
resources.  
Even though capital funding is not a natural resource, the question of how to 
efficiently manage and operate a fixed, shared resource system is still the problem at 
hand. ROSCAs begin to deal with this problem through its membership selection and the 
rotation order. The initial risk associated with forming a long-enduring ROSCA 
agreement is determining who is allowed to contribute to and draw from the communal 
capital fund – i.e. defining the boundaries of the CPR. This risk is initially born by the 
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originator of the ROSCA who is responsible for the overall efficiency of creating and 
managing the ROSCA prior to any type of complex rule agreements (Ardener 1964). In 
regards to membership, the originator must decide between the quantity and quality of the 
members allowed to join and there is a tradeoff between these two factors. The originator 
can attempt to organize a small group of people who have a low-risk of defaulting 
regarding periodic payments. However, limiting the number of members to only those 
who are the most credit worthy would require much larger payments from each member 
of the ROSCA which would increase their risk of defaulting. Extending membership to 
those that have higher risks of defaulting allows each member to make smaller payments 
to the ROSCA over an extended period of time which reduces the overall harm caused by 
any one default though there may be higher rates of default. Even though there may be a 
higher rate of non-compliance and default, the burden that it would place on a larger 
group would be much smaller than if the group were smaller and the payments required 
of each individual were larger. Given these conditions, the originator of a ROSCA has a 
strong incentive to use local information about the credit-worthiness of individuals to 
recruit as many credit-worthy members as possible. There is a trade-off between safety 
and decreased costs that each ROSCA must balance effectively to remain solvent and 
sustainable. 
The problem of ensuring long-term survival of the ROSCA is further dealt with 
via determining the rotation schedule of the funds. Though this is done in many ways and 
can be either predetermined, decided by lot, or done by some bidding schedule, the 
originator can use any of these methods to help prevent against non-cooperative strategies 
and long-term sustainability (Henever 2006). For example, in a system of fixed 
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contributions and a predetermined rotation schedule, those individuals that are the most 
credit-worthy will most likely receive the funds earlier in the rotation schedule and those 
who have a higher risk of possible default receive the funds later (van der Brink and 
Chavas 1997). It is up to the originator and members of the ROSCA to determine this 
subjective definition of credit-worthiness and manage the risks of the commonly-pooled 
fund. The earlier positions in the rotation schedule are the most advantageous positions 
because those who receive the pool first are the net receivers of credit. What incentive 
then do the least credit-worthy members, those who are forced to be in latter part of the 
rotation schedule, have to remain in the ROSCA if they receive, on net, less credit than 
those earlier in the rotation? If ROSCAs were a one-shot game – where there were no 
long-lasting enduring consequences of being a member of the association – those 
individuals that are least credit-worthy would have little incentive to join a ROSCA.  
However, being a member of a ROSCA, no matter your credit-worthiness, is an 
advantageous position to be in because it gives individuals a chance to establish a credit 
history with the community (Ardener 1964). Even if you are in the latter part of the 
rotation schedule, members are able to establish a credit rapport and reputation within the 
community which makes it more likely for them to be considered for other ROSCAs in 
the future in which they might be in the earlier portion of the rotation schedules. Thus, 
the repeated nature of ROSCAs allow for individuals to develop credit ranking and the 
net benefits of ROSCAs, both to the community and to the individual, have to be 
calculated over more than one period of time. The selection of membership and order of 
the rotation cycle are some of the most powerful tools the originators of ROSCAs have at 
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their disposal to incentivize the member to maintain a cooperative strategy and ensure 
long-term sustainability of the communal fund. 
However, despite the strong incentive to minimize the chance of any one member 
of the ROSCA defaulting, the rotation system acts as a monitoring system. Not only does 
the originator and the few ROSCA managers try to monitor the compliance of all of the 
members, each member has a strong incentive to monitor and report any risky behaviors, 
such as misuse of the funds once they were distributed to an individual, of all other 
members within the ROSCA (van der Brink and Chavas 1997). Any one person 
defaulting directly harms everyone else within the pool and therefore the costs of 
monitoring also have direct personal benefits. Furthermore, those towards the end of the 
rotation cycle have a disproportionately large incentive to monitor because they bear a 
larger share of the costs associated default due to the probability that more people have 
the chance to default before the pool circles around to them. Furthermore, given that the 
rotation cycle is known and not random – which is not always the case in more complex 
ROSCAs – the next person in line to receive the pooled funds has a disproportionately 
large incentive to monitor and report any rule infractions of the person who is directly 
before him to ensure that he does not incur any extra costs associated with someone 
defaulting. In this case, not only do all members have a strong personal incentive to 
monitor each other to ensure compliance with the rules, but the role of primary monitor, 
and all of the costs associated with being the primary monitor, rotate evenly around the 
ROSCA unless you are the first person to receive the funds. The costs of monitoring are, 
for the most part, evenly distributed among the members of the fund and no single 
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individual has to bear undue burden from being the primary monitor for an extended 
period of time. 
Despite the strong pressures and mechanisms in place to prevent people from 
defaulting, occasional defaults are a reality that have to be resolved accordingly. Most 
commonly, if an individual defaults, which constitutes a rule infraction, the members and 
originator of the fund take the circumstances of the default into account and decide 
accordingly on the proper measure to take in an attempt to punish the individual, 
maintain that individual’s membership within the association, and compensate any other 
members for the loss that they may have incurred (Ardener 1964). Most ROSCAs have 
some insurance mechanism to ensure that those who do default have a chance to resolve 
their issues financially and maintain their membership. These take the form of being able 
to delay payment to the fund, borrow money from another appropriator or from some 
second emergency fund that was set up when the ROSCA originated, or offer up 
collateral for the span of that payment cycle (Ibid.). As long as the default is temporary 
and the individual is able to quickly financially resolve the issues that led to the default, 
they may be able to maintain membership in the ROSCA with little to no financial or 
personal costs.  
However, in the case where there is a definite default and there are no chances of 
being able to resolve the issue, in which case the individual who defaulted must leave the 
ROSCA, there are a number of punishments, that range from mild to severe, that can be 
imposed upon that person by the remaining members of the fund. A common form of 
punishment is that the person who defaulted has to pay a nominal fee and decreased 
credit ranking within the community. The combination of social harassment, decreased 
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ability to receive credit in the future, and minimal monetary fees seem to be the most 
common form of punishment and, in empirical examples, sufficient enough to prevent 
people from defaulting. However, more severe punishments have been recorded such as 
complete ostracism from the community, repossession of the defaulter’s personal 
property, and even bodily harm (Ibid.). However, these punishments are typically 
reserved for those individuals who had already received their turn in the rotation and 
gained access to the funds and defaulted afterward due to some egregious misuse of the 
funds.  This is seen as theft and the benefits associated with punishing a thief are much 
greater than punishing someone who was temporarily unable to contribute to the fund. 
The graduated sanctions and punishments are dependent upon the costs associated with 
the punishment. The remaining members of the ROSCA will continue to punish up to the 
point where the marginal costs associated with punishment equal the marginal benefits 
reaped from harming the defaulter. And because the costs of default are shared among all 
members of the ROSCA, the sanctions will be fairly mild and distributed among the 
members.  
The institutional framework of ROSCAs formation follows all seven design 
principles of CPR agreements and can be illustrated as such because of the nature of the 
resource being pooled. Though capital is different in many ways than natural resources, 
the same framework can be applied in understanding how they are formed and why they 
are so successful at providing entrepreneurs in Botswana with capital that is sufficient for 
capital accumulation. However, different types of ROSCAs are better at providing 
different types of capital than are others. Some are better for small groups of individuals 
and some are better fitting for large groups. The three most common ROSCAs which are 
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most regularly constructed in Botswana are the simple/random ROSCA, consumer 
durable ROSCA, and discounting ROSCA.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM BOTSWANA 
 
 
Types of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
In the case of a simple or random ROSCA, each individual contributes a 
predetermined and fixed sum of money to the collective fund. The originator of the fund 
– the individual who bore the costs of organizing and managing the funds – commonly is 
the first member to receive the funds. However, the remaining members of the ROSCA 
are either chosen by merit and credit-worthiness or by random lottery. Each member of 
the fund contributes his periodic contribution until the fund has rotated so that all 
members have had a chance to receive the pool. Each member of the association 
contributes the same amount and receives the full amount that they have contributed. In 
this form, there is no net monetary gain or loss for any participant in the association 
(Okurut and Thuto 2009). However, those who receive the pool first are net debtors and 
those who receive the funds last are net savers. Each individual wants to be the first, 
however, according to chance or credit-worthiness, there is an order of diminishing 
benefits. Though the last person who receives the pot accrues no monetary loss – for they 
could have done just as well if they had set aside periodic payments equal to the amount 
of his ROSCA contributions – he does succeed in gaining a reputation of being credit-
worthy. This increases his chances at gaining entry to ROSCAs with larger pools where 
he might be able to get a more favorable position in the rotation cycle. 
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A discounting ROSCA uses a system of bidding for the communal funds as the 
means of determining who receives the pooled funds first. After the individuals have 
been organized by the originator and the rules of the ROSCA have defined by the 
participants, the first round of contributions are collected and pooled. Again, in most 
cases, this first rotation is commonly given to the originator. However, in each successive 
round, the contributors compete for access to the funds for this period. At the beginning 
of each period, the contributors offer bids for what they are willing to pay to receive the 
funds. The person with the highest bid gains access to the funds. However, this bid 
translates into a discounted rate for the remaining members who have yet to receive the 
pot. The amount of the pooled resources change with each rotation and so do the 
individual payments of those who have yet to receive the pool. Due to this framework, 
those who receive the pot earlier – after the originator has had his turn – receive a smaller 
pool than those who receive it later in the rotation cycle. In this system, the effects of 
discounting are illustrated because there are net borrowers and lenders of capital funds. 
As such, there is an internal interest rate within bidding ROSCAs which is demonstrated 
by the individuals’ bids (Henever 2006). Below is a chart illustrating the effects of a 
discounting ROSCA: 
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This table illustrates how a ROSCA of seven people over seven periods of time 
contribute, bid, and receive the commonly pooled capital funds. Those individuals who 
have not received the funds at a particular period are the only ones eligible for the 
discount after a bid for the funds is made. Therefore, those who receive the pool later in 
the rotation cycle are those who receive greater financial outcomes relative to the others 
in the association (with the exception of the originator). In this generic example, 
individuals M6 an M7 are net lenders in this particular ROSCA and, as a result, receive 
interest payments on their loans to the net borrowers – M1-M5.  
Thirdly, a consumer durable goods (CDG) ROSCA is common in Botswana, but 
nowhere near as prevalent as the simple or bidding ROSCAs. A CDG ROSCA is a slight 
variation on the simple ROSCA. As in the simple ROSCA, an originator organizes a 
group of individuals who, over a predetermined time period, contribute a fixed amount to 
a pooled fund. However, instead of receiving the pooled funds in each rotation, the 
appropriators receive some durable good that has been decided upon prior to the 
formation of the association. The originator usually is guaranteed some discounted price 
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under the guarantee that they buy a certain number of goods over a period of time. Thus, 
by pooling their funds the association is able to negotiate for goods at a lower price than 
if they were to operate individually (Anderson and Baland 2002). A CDG ROSCA is less 
flexible than simple and discounting ROSCAs, but they also avoid a lot of the problems 
associated with CPR agreements as well. Monitoring, sanctions, and rule enforcement all 
apply, but not to the same degree as other ROSCAs. 
Though there are other, less common, forms that ROSCAs have taken in 
Botswana, the simple/random, discounting, and consumer durable goods ROSCAs are the 
most common forms (Henever 2006). They provide flexibility and much needed support 
to those entrepreneurs who are seeking to start small enterprises, need temporary loans, 
or use the funds for consumption smoothing. Furthermore, the type of ROSCA and the 
rules which constitute it are chosen based on the needs of the constituents of the fund. 
Each agreement’s framework is created under the requirement that it will most efficiently 
meet the desires of its members. As such, the members of ROSCAs use different types of 
ROSCAs for different things. 
 How ROSCAs are used in Botswana 
In the instance of simple/random ROSCAs, the funds are commonly used for the 
start-up and expansion of small, commercial enterprises (Okurut and Thuto 2009). 
Depending on the size of the fund, the capital can be used for anything from buying or 
leasing a small property to open a shop in a rural village to buying a small vehicle for 
transportation services; both are anecdotal examples of how simple ROSCAs have been 
used in rural Botswana. Because of the size and the relative similarity of the members in 
simple ROSCAs, they provide one of the easiest forms of credit for small entrepreneurs 
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in both the traditional rural sector and the poor informal, urban sectors of the population. 
Individuals with common goals, visions, and ability come together to form a communally 
owned resource from which they can start their own enterprises. As such, not only are the 
appropriators of the funds connected by just a mere credit agreement, but they have an 
incentive to help and support the small businesses that result from the ROSCA. To ensure 
repayment and the opportunity for more capital, the members of the fund patronize the 
services of the other members to both monitor their business activities to ensure 
compliance and ensure that they are able to continue to be contributing members of the 
fund. 
Discounting ROSCAs typically have much larger pools and memberships, and 
have some degree of influence on other local enterprises that are not members of the 
fund. Discounting ROSCAs, because they can take interest rates into account, sometimes 
act as lending agencies to individuals that are not members of the fund. There are cases 
where members of discount ROSCAs receive the funds and then start their own money 
lending enterprises (Shanmugam 1989). They will use the large sums which originate 
from the discounting ROSCA – which typically have more stringent membership 
restrictions where only the most credit-worthy can gain access – to allocate credit through 
direct money lending, opening pawn shops, and organizing other informal credit 
agreements such as savings and credit cooperatives (which are similar to, but different 
institutionally from ROSCAs). Because in a discount ROSCA there is a chance of losing 
money if you agree to take out the funds earlier in the rotation cycle, many individuals 
use the money in multiple ways to try and receive a return on their risk. There are also 
instances where members have used the funds to start their own small enterprise, but due 
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to the large pool size, use any excess funds to invest in other local and foreign businesses. 
Discounting ROSCAs offer credit-worthy individuals with flexibility to use the funds in 
the most profitable ways, but this also increases the monitoring, punishment, and 
opportunity costs of the other members of the agreement. Sanctions for defaulting are 
typically greater in discounting ROSCAs because the funds offer a great deal of 
flexibility with the opportunity of personal success that do not benefit the original 
ROSCA beyond the repayment of the funds (Bouman 1995). Discounting ROSCAs have 
acted almost as decentralized banking units in many poor areas of Botswana, primarily 
rural villages. 
CDG ROSCAs though, because they are less prevalent, have much smaller pools 
and much smaller memberships. In Botswana, CDG ROSCA membership is made up 
primarily of women – more than 52% in the areas surrounding Gaborone (Okurut and 
Thuto 2009). Women in Botswana constitute a majority in small urban and rural 
marketplaces where they sell homemade goods and services that range from clothing, 
foods, and other services that can be administered from the home. As such, CDG 
ROSCAs buy goods that can be easily bought, transported, and used within the home so 
that the women have a residential enterprise from which they are able to conduct 
business. Some examples of goods that are common are materials include in-home repair 
and extension, cell phones, cloth and other fabrics, as well as household goods such as 
manual sewing machines and washing machines. Women use these goods and services to 
sell and trade in the local marketplace to help support their households. There are even 
cases where CDG ROSCAs are used to help support and supply households with 
additional incomes so that other members in the household, who are attempting to start 
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their own enterprises with funds received from a separate ROSCA, can make repayments 
to simple and discounting ROSCAs. In small, limited communities, small ROSCAs, and 
the enterprises that result from them, support larger more flexible ROSCAs. 
Even though ROSCAs have been very successful tools in creating robust and 
flexible credit for many individuals, they do not answer the question as to why they exist 
even when formal credit institutions are present and why the number of recorded 
ROSCAs that have come into existence have increased in recent years (Mosene 2002). 
According to Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, an increase in credit 
regulation and regulation of formal institutions have led individuals to turn to informal 
sources of credit due to increased costs associated with acting within the formal credit 
markets (Okurut and Thuto 2009). Within Gaborone and the surrounding rural areas, the 
number of new ROSCAs have more than doubled from more than 5 years ago when 
formal banks underwent serious regulatory reform which limited their ability to make 
small business loans and loans to low-income families who had collateral to safeguard 
against default. The costs associated with giving small loans to these individuals 
increased as banks now had significantly higher regulatory costs including fees on 
compliance with new laws, overwhelming underwriting standards, and time costs that 
involved gathering more background and personal information on those individuals 
seeking loans (Harvey 2013). The increased costs that formal banks had to incur in order 
to make the loans were significantly higher than any return that they would have made by 
successfully having the loan repaid. This pushed poor and low income individuals who 
were seeking small business loans out of the market. As a result, they either had to resort 
29 
 
to alternative credit source or save a significant portion of their income over a prolonged 
period of time. 
Ostrom’s CPR analysis helps us realize why ROSCAs have been such a beneficial 
and enduring tool for those individuals that were recently pushed out of the formal credit 
market. All of the costs that banks would have incurred by giving these individuals loans 
are either non-existent or widely dispersed among the members of the ROSCA. 
Monitoring costs, credit evaluation, and administrative costs are shared by the members 
and each member receives benefits by internalizing those costs.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE POLICY PRESCRIPTION 
 
 
Understanding the institutional development of informal credit markets is key to 
understanding that there is an unseen path for Africa to solve its endemic problems. 
Botswana, through its relative tolerance of informal credit markets, has shown that capital 
accumulation, which is necessary to solve this problem, is possible. Though informal 
credit markets may not play as much of a role in the future, as Botswana develops and 
household income and well-being increases, they do play a large role in many developing 
areas of Botswana today (Geertz 1962). Letting these institutions exist and play a role in 
local communities can be one way that these communities develop economically.  
In the mid-1990s Botswana ranked 23rd in an index of countries that were best suited for 
foreign investment. However, since then it has lost some of its competitive advantage and 
as of the early 2000s it ranked 123rd on the same index (Gwebu). In an ever competitive 
world, Botswana has to have some economic growth that will enable it to compete with 
other, wealthier countries for outside capital; ROSCAs may help it, at least in part, regain 
some of that competitive advantage. Because Botswana is not the prime location for 
outside capital investment, that initial growth will have to come from endogenous sources 
and Botswana entrepreneurs will have to be primary driver of that growth. Though 
ROSCAs may not be able to provide large sources of capital funding for all sectors of 
Botswana’s economy, limiting their growth or hindering them in any way could very well 
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be counterproductive to producing that endogenous source of growth. Though Botswana 
has improved in recent years in their ease of doing business and the quality of their 
regulations – which both benefit and support the growth of indigenous credit – they still 
have a far way to come (Savard 2013). ROSCAs are just one factor that may increase the 
access to capital to entrepreneurs and the central and local governments should do what 
they can to foster their growth. Now what that means is under debate. 
Elinor Ostrom provided a detailed method for understanding common-pooled 
resources which can be directly applied to rotating savings and credit association – which 
are the most common form of informal credit in many areas of Botswana. She outlined a 
set of seven design principles which are necessary to understanding how and why 
ROSCAs could formed and why they are sustainable over prolonged period of time. 
Because they are sustainable, proven to be relatively efficient at distributing capital, and 
are created given local traditions, norms, and information, they have become serious 
substitutes for many sectors of the Botswana population. Furthermore, recent changes to 
the legal framework of Botswana’s formal banking industry have increased the relative 
costs of issuing small loans to individuals which has created a demand for greater 
informal credit.  
Because they have become serious substitutes for formal credit markets and have 
risen to fill the gap left from decreased supply of formal credit, attempts have been made 
to regulate, outlaw, and, in some cases, support and extend ROSCAs to a greater number 
of people. Many policy recommendations have been made by a variety of economists and 
none have been sufficient in considering the unique institutional design of ROSCAs that 
make them successful. One option that was presented by Yusuf et. al. (2009) was that the 
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federal government and central bank could offer insurance programs via small loans that 
would protect against the threat of default. Though fear of default is an issue that limits 
the amount of credit a ROSCA can offer, it is necessary in order to prevent excess default 
rates. Because there is the fear of members defaulting, ROSCAs limit entry into the 
agreement, mutually monitor the members, and assign appropriate sanctions to ensure 
that default rates are minimum. An insurance program would, in essence, make members 
and the ROSCA as a whole make riskier decisions than they otherwise would have. 
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems would result if the cost of making a bad 
decision were decreased. A government-backed security agency could, therefore, increase 
default rates. 
Another policy prescriptions involves formalizing ROSCAs in an attempt to make 
them more available to different sectors of the population that otherwise would not need 
them for access to credit. This is an attempt to expand the role that ROSCAs play in 
Botswana’s development so that more people and sectors could benefit from their unique 
institutional design (Okurut and Thuto 2009). While these steps might be helpful in 
protecting ROSCA members and their assets, it would bring them under a legal system 
which they currently actively avoid. The additional regulatory costs and external 
oversight would disrupt the dynamic that makes the institutions robust. Any additional 
costs or outside interference would increase the cost of operation and violate the design 
principle that there must be congruence between the rules and local conditions/customs.  
However, there are certain policy prescription which could be very beneficial to the 
development of ROSCAs. Simply allowing for the institutions to exist without any 
attempts to regulate or alter their management would allow for them for them to develop 
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independently of centralized authorities. Allowing for them to exist without any 
centralized support or interference, while recognizing their right to organize as 
institutions could be very beneficial. Though the Botswana government should recognize 
them, they should also recognize that any governmental attempts to help the institutions, 
would not be sufficient, and possibly harmful, due to the inherent 
informational/knowledge problem and administrative limitations of a centralized 
authority which does not have direct access to the information that the members of the 
fund have. This policy prescription was Ostrom’s seventh design principle. 
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